Attackers
Who is behind the documented disruptions?
Usually, the public record does not say. COLDGUARD reports attribution as a confidence level per finding and groups findings by the adversary-driven pattern they describe. It never names a threat actor or group.
How often attribution is established
Dataset demo-2026.11.07 · methodology 0.1-draft
| Level | Findings |
|---|---|
| High attribution | 42 |
| Moderate attribution | 34 |
| Limited attribution | 1 |
| Not attributed | 20 |
High attribution
42
43.3% of published findings
Moderate attribution
34
35.1% of published findings
Limited attribution
1
1% of published findings
Not attributed
20
20.6% of published findings
Read together: 76 of 97 published findings carry high or moderate attribution, and 20 carry none. The gap is the headline. It reflects what organizations, regulators, and reporters choose to publish, not the true share of disruptions with a known cause.
Adversary-driven patterns
Six of the twelve COLDGUARD issue classes describe activity that requires an adversary. The other six describe exposure or governance gaps that may or may not have been exploited. Only the first group is counted here.
Adversary-driven findings
59
Published findings in the six adversary-driven issue classes.
Exposure and governance findings
38
Segmentation, monitoring integrity, continuity, configuration, physical dependency, other.
Attributed within adversary-driven
38
High or moderate attribution confidence.
Findings by adversary pattern
| Category | findings |
|---|---|
| Exploitable software weakness | 31 |
| Remote access exploitation | 7 |
| Ransomware and system disruption | 6 |
| Data theft and exposure | 6 |
| Credential and identity abuse | 5 |
| Supplier compromise | 4 |
Documented impact of adversary-driven findings
| Category | findings |
|---|---|
| Unknown | 29 |
| No documented impact | 6 |
| Temperature assurance | 6 |
| Operational interruption | 5 |
| Inventory integrity | 5 |
| Clinical service continuity | 3 |
| Data confidentiality | 3 |
| Multiple | 2 |
| Pattern | What it covers | Issue class | Published | Attributed | Explore |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Exploitable software weakness | A public vulnerability disclosure affecting equipment or software used in the sector. | Software vulnerability disclosure | 31 | 11 | Findings |
| Remote access exploitation | Vendor or staff remote access paths used as an entry point. | Remote access governance | 7 | 7 | Findings |
| Ransomware and system disruption | Extortion or sabotage that halts monitoring, inventory, or release systems. | Ransomware or system disruption | 6 | 5 | Findings |
| Data theft and exposure | Donor, patient, or customer records taken or exposed. | Data protection and privacy | 6 | 6 | Findings |
| Credential and identity abuse | Compromised, shared, or stale credentials used to reach internal systems. | Identity and access | 5 | 5 | Findings |
| Supplier compromise | A third party software, logistics, or service provider is the documented origin. | Vendor and supply chain | 4 | 4 | Findings |
Exposure and governance classes not counted above: OT / IT segmentation; Monitoring integrity; Incident response and continuity; Configuration or policy disclosure; Physical / digital dependency; Other documented.
Adversary-driven reports by first publication year
| Year | Findings |
|---|---|
| 2019 | 4 |
| 2020 | 5 |
| 2021 | 8 |
| 2022 | 7 |
| 2023 | 6 |
| 2024 | 11 |
| 2025 | 5 |
| 2026 | 13 |
Attribution by sector
| Sector | Published | Attributed | Share |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blood Banks | 37 | 31 | 84% |
| Blood Storage | 19 | 13 | 68% |
| Cold Storage | 16 | 10 | 63% |
| Food Storage | 25 | 22 | 88% |
Sector differences are at least partly reporting differences. See methodology §9 before comparing.
Reference frameworks
Pattern names on this page follow public taxonomies. These are vocabularies, not data feeds: COLDGUARD does not ingest records from them, and nothing above is attributed to them.
CISA #StopRansomware advisories
US Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
Ransomware pattern vocabulary and sector advisories.
https://www.cisa.gov/stopransomwareENISA Threat Landscape
European Union Agency for Cybersecurity
European threat category definitions.
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/cyber-threats/threat-landscapeMITRE ATT&CK for ICS
MITRE
Technique names where a public source is specific enough to map.
https://attack.mitre.org/matrices/ics/HHS Health Sector Cybersecurity Coordination Center
US Department of Health and Human Services
Health sector threat briefs relevant to blood services.
https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/asa/ocio/hc3/index.html
What this page will not do
- Name a group, campaign, or individual, even when a cited source does. Readers can follow the source link on each finding.
- Infer an attacker from a pattern. A ransomware finding with no stated actor stays unattributed.
- Publish techniques, tooling, or targeting detail that would help reproduce an attack.
- Rank countries or organizations by attacker interest. Coverage differences would dominate any such ranking.
Corrections to any attribution level go through the corrections process. The underlying counts are available as JSON at /api/v1/attackers/summary/index.json.